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This research seeks to find root causes of Class A or B mishaps in Navy 
surface ships in order to identify ships at risk for future mishaps. Additionally, by 
looking at data from ships that experienced mishaps between 2012 and 2017, and 
by searching beyond the root cause of specific causal factors for these incidents, 
we may be able to determine if indicator variables could have predicted the ships 
were at risk. We explored the LHD, LPD (San Antonio Class), and CG ship classes, 
as these classes experienced the most mishaps between 2012 and 2017. We used 
linear regression, descriptive statistics, time-series analysis, and data optimization 
as the primary methods to examine our collected data. We implemented a reverse-
forecasting, or “backcasting,” approach to correlate variables to LHD, LPD, and 
CG class ships that experienced a Class A or B mishap in the studied years. We 
were unable to identify a correlation in the numerous data sets. Small amounts of 
correlation were found in the data models, but nothing statistically significant that 
would help predict future mishaps. 
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This research sought to provide a predictive tool to identify ships at risk of 
Class A and B mishaps based on current inspections, certifications, assessments, 
visits or other current events and incidents onboard a ship that might help identify 
ships at risk for future mishaps. We examined a number of variables to include 
casualty report counts, casualty report durations, departure from specifications 
report counts, timing of critical billet changes, safety assessment scores, Board of 
Inspection and Survey (INSURV) inspection results, steaming hours as a measure 
of operating tempo (OPTEMPO), and duration of maintenance availability periods 
as a measure of OPTEMTO, each of which may prove to contribute toward the 
manifestation of a mishap. This research focused on the Wasp-Class Amphibious 
Assault Ship (LHD), San Antonio-Class Amphibious Transport Dock Ship (LPD), 
and Ticonderoga-Class Cruiser (CG) with the hopes of potentially extending to 
additional ship classes. By analyzing the data from ships that have experienced 
mishaps and by going beyond root cause of specific causal factors for that incident, 
we may be able to determine the relationship of numerous indicator variables that 
may have predicted the ship was at risk. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The military takes precautions to minimize risk in all activities. Guidance for 
investigation of Navy and Marine Corps mishaps is defined in the Chief of Naval 
Operations Instruction (OPNAVINST) 5102.1D CH-2 signed 2010. Our research 
focused on mishaps that have occurred for a select set of ship classes from 2012–
2017. Mishaps are classified by severity (A, B, C) and may change as additional 
information is gathered throughout the investigation process. OPNAVINST 
5102.1D CH-2 provides the official definitions of all three classes of DoD Mishaps. 
The definition of a Class A mishap is when total cost of damages to 
Department of Defense (DoD) or non-DoD property is an amount of 
$2 million or more; a DoD aircraft is destroyed; or an injury and/or 
occupational illness result in a fatality or permanent total disability. A 
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Class ‘B’ mishap results in a total cost of damages to DoD or non-
DoD property of $500,000 or more, but less than $2 million; an injury 
and/or occupational illness resulting in permanent partial disability or 
when three or more personnel are hospitalized for inpatient care 
(beyond observation) as a result of a single mishap. A Class ‘C’ 
mishap results in a total cost of damages to DoD or non-DoD 
property of $50,000 or more, but less than $500,000; or an event 
involving one or more DoD personnel that results in one or more days 
away from work. (Department of the Navy, 2010, p. 2-1) 
The mishaps investigated for this research include government property 
damage (shipboard equipment) and personnel injury. As our research progressed, 
one element of data that was identified as a potential factor in mishap correlation 
was Casualty Reports (CASREP) for a given command. The Navy’s current 
CASREP guidance is directed in the Commander, Naval Surface Forces 
Pacific/Commander, Naval Surface Forces Atlantic (COMNAVSURFPAC/ 
COMNAVSURFLANT) Instruction 3040.2 from 2013. The purpose of a CASREP 
is to report an equipment degradation to the operational commander that will 
impact readiness. CASREPs are classified in three categories (C-2, C-3, and C-4) 
to differentiate the severity. C-4 is the most severe while C-2 is the least severe. 
The guidance on classification can be found in OPNAVINST 5513.3C. C-4 
CASREPS must be updated every 72 hours, C-3 updates occur every 10 days, C-
2 updates not to exceed 30 days (Department of the Navy, 2013). Reporting 
CASREPs and equipment casualties are very important for making sure the ship 
gets the attention needed and repairs conducted in a timely manner. For the 
purpose of our research, we looked very closely at the number of CASREPs a 
specific unit had in all categories of severity leading up to the mishap. We also 
attempted to determine if there was an increasing trend or spike in number 
submitted. In addition to CASREP counts we also examined CASREP duration. 
CASREP duration was the cumulative number of hours each CASREP was open 
for a particular month. For example, if a ship had ten CASREPs in a month for ten 
hours each, then the total CASREP duration for that month would be 100 hours. 
Once a CASREP is closed it is no longer updated and does not contribute to the 
 3 
CASREP duration for that particular month. CASREP duration numbers were also 
separated by CASREP category.  
Another critical piece of data that was recommended for review was 
Departure from Specifications (DFS). The Joint Fleet Maintenance Manual 
provides us with the US Navy’s definition of DFS.  
Specifications are engineered requirements such as type of 
materials, dimensional clearances, vibration levels, flow rates, and 
physical location in which ship components are installed, tested, and 
maintained. All ships are designed and constructed to specific 
technical and physical requirements and it is imperative that every 
effort be made to maintain all ship systems and components to their 
designed specifications. (Department of the Navy, 2017, p. V-1-8-1) 
On occasion these specifications cannot be met and this is reported with a 
DFS. The approving official of a DFS is usually a technical organization, which is 
designated by Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
(COMNAVSEASYSCOM). The two classes of DFSs are major and minor, with sub 
classifications of permanent and temporary. Permanent requires no additional 
repair and is approved to be permanent throughout the life cycle of the ship and is 
approved only by COMNAVSEASYSCOM. The Joint Fleet Maintenance Manual 
also provides clarification between a major and minor DFS. 
A major DFS is one that affects performance, durability, reliability or 
maintainability, interchangeability, effective use of operation, weight 
or appearance, health or safety, system design parameters, such as 
schematics, flow, pressures, or temperatures; or compartment 
arrangements or assigned function. A minor DFS is considered any 
condition that is not a major DFS. (Department of the Navy, 2017, 
pp. V-1-8-3–V-1-8-6) 
Trends in DFSs highlight areas of concern to technical organizations like 
COMNAVSEASYSCOM. Identifying these trends early assists 
COMNAVSEASYSCOM in preventing mechanical issues before they occur. 
Naval ships experience rigorous inspections in all areas across the life cycle 
of that platform. Mandated by Congress every five years is an inspection called the 
Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV). All naval vessels are expected to be in 
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compliance with INSURVINST 4730.5R, May 2014. As recommended by our 
research sponsor, COMNAVSURFPAC, we collected INSURV scores due to their 
relevance to the materiel condition, warfare preparedness, and readiness of the 
ships we were researching as part of this study. As stated in INSURVINST 
4730.1R, this instruction provides the guidance for conducting INSURV trials and 
inspections. Furthermore, the instruction provides guidance on where to obtain 
checklists needed by ship’s crew to prepare the ship for the INSURV inspection 
and presentation (Department of the Navy, 2014). INSURV Scores are based on 
the INSURV Figure of Merit (IFOM) percentage. As stated in the INSURV 
inspection handbook July 2017, IFOM is an overall ship grade computed from the 
average of the weighted equipment operational capabilities and demonstration 
scores and is included in the formal post inspection message. A locally generated 
document created by INSURV clarifies the IFOM scoring in greater detail. Before 
adopting the IFOM scoring, the Board previously graded material readiness as 
Satisfactory, Degraded, of Unsatisfactory. As stated from INSURV document 
3.2.1, in order to establish a more objective and consistent material readiness 
metric, the Board eliminated the mission area construct and began scoring ships 
based on a weighted average of the material condition of equipment in functional 
areas and the results from system demonstrations. During the inspection, up to 
100,000 shipboard material items are inspected depending on the ship class. 
Functional areas, previously known as warfare areas, demonstration scores are 
weighted based on their importance to the platform’s primary mission and are 
averaged to form an overall IFOM score. The final scoring will be between 0.0 and 
1.0 and is compared to other ships of the same class to assess the strength or 
weakness of the score.   
The U.S. Navy is very detailed in tracking energy usage on afloat units. 
OPNAVINST 4100.11C describes the U.S. Navy’s policy and reporting 
requirement for Navy Energy Reporting System (NEURS). NEURS provides the 
inventory information, re-supply, sale, and consumption of F76 and JP-5 types of 
fuel aboard all ships. In accordance with the OPNAVINST 4100.11C, all 
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commissioned ships, except nuclear submarines must submit NEURS reports 
monthly to document fuel consumption. These reports can be prepared utilizing 
the applicable Fleet instructions: Commander, Atlantic Fleet Instruction 
(COMLANTFLTINST) 4100.3 and Commander, Pacific Fleet Instruction 
(COMPACFLTINST) 9261.1A. The objective of the NEURS reporting and 
database is to consolidate asset employment, scheduling, monitor consumption, 
and enhance awareness. Knowledge of how much fuel any given unit is consuming 
is an important part of this study.  
Ships will enter and exit many dry dockings and maintenance activities 
throughout their life. To gain awareness on OPTEMPO and if a ship was recently 
in a maintenance repair status, we utilized the Fleet Engineers for 
COMNAVSURFPAC and their scheduling team for the past and upcoming 
statuses of when a ship entered and exited a specific maintenance availability 
period. Whether this maintenance availability period was a short pier-side 
availability or a dry-docking availability, it is important to compare the data from 
recent availabilities to when a mishap may have occurred. Upon exiting a major 
overhaul, ships encounter numerous turnover of crew and generally have a less 
experienced crew than prior to entering. Following major repairs, the specific unit 
will undergo many inspections to begin the re-certifying of every warfare area and 
training the crew for upcoming events. This is a very vulnerable time in a ship’s 
life, as it begins to regain operational tempo from a period of not being underway 
for a significant amount of time and usually less trained crew than a ship that has 
successfully completed the basic training cycle at the peak of their sustainment 
with a qualified crew.   
The Commanding Officer (CO) of Navy ships typically turns over and has a 
change of command every 18 months, as discussed in the Surface Warfare Officer 
Personnel Department (PERS-41) Surface Warfare Officer projected timeline. This 
timeline can be adjusted for various reasons but for the purpose of this research 
our modeling used 18 months as the as the average amount of time a CO is in 
command for any given unit. Identifying the length of time for which a CO was in 
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command of a ship and the seniority of that specific CO are or could be important 
pieces of data relating to the occurrence of a mishap. 
This research used ship safety data to identify possible leading indicators 
of a mishap. Each afloat unit undergoes a Safety Inspection from the Naval Safety 
Center every two years or where it fits best in their operational schedule. The Naval 
Afloat Safety Pre-Survey Message is a message sent to the ship being inspected 
prior to the safety team’s arrival. It explains the requirements and guidance of the 
upcoming safety inspection and how ships are to prepare. As our research is safety 
driven, we thought the data collected in the safety inspections might help identify 
where a specific unit was not in compliance with the safety guidance and isolate 
contributing factors for a mishap occurring. 
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
In an era of limited resources, the Navy is consistently asked to search for 
ways to reduce its costs and to perform with increased efficiency. In the area of 
safety, we seek to learn how and why Class A and B mishaps occur. In addition, 
we seek to identify trends common to ships that have and have not experienced 
Class A and B mishaps. We note that there likely exist numerous, highly correlated 
and predictive variables that may show causation into the likelihood of mishap 
occurrence. Also, we may discover new insight into the identification of other 
avenues to explore and minimize these incidents. We performed this analysis 
across the LHD Wasp class, LPD San Antonio class, and CG Ticonderoga class 
ships due to these ship classes having disproportionately large number of mishaps 
compared to other ship classes during the last 5 years. The goal was to develop a 
predictive tool for identifying ships at risk before mishaps occur and to help identify 
potential and appropriate timeframes for command interventions. 
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Class A and B mishaps cost the DoD millions of dollars and in the worst-
case scenarios result in loss of life or permanent disability. Class A and B mishaps 
can also result in the loss of aircraft or serious degradation to the ability of ships to 
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perform their mission. Currently the U.S. Navy does not have a capability to identify 
ships at risk of experiencing a Class A or B mishap. The ability to identify U.S. 
Navy ships that are statistically likely to experience these mishaps before they 
happen could potentially save millions of taxpayer dollars. More importantly, this 
research could save the lives of U.S. Navy Sailors. 
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The scope of this research was limited to the LHD Wasp class, LPD San 
Antonio class, CG Ticonderoga class, and the mishaps which occurred on those 
ship classes from the year 2012 to 2017. The limitations inherent to this type of 
research and analysis are related to the quality, availability, and consistency of the 
data gathered. No statistical model, especially one of this nature, can infer a cause-
and-effect relationship between mishaps and variables. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Our literature review indicated that this is the first time Class A and Class B 
mishaps are being predicted in this manner perhaps due to the specificity of this 
research. However, multiple studies have been conducted to attempt to correlate 
variables with ship safety mishaps or accidents in the commercial sector as well 
as within the DoD. One study conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
that researched the relation of Command Safety Assessment Survey data and 
U.S. Naval Aviation mishaps found only limited value in the correlation of 
Command Safety Climate and mishaps (Le, 2017). This research concluded that 
blame and punishment are not constructive in efforts to promote safety within the 
workplace. Another study conducted at NPS attempted to compare the validity of 
stochastic models developed to predict maintenance-related mishaps in Naval 
Aviation against models using the variable Poisson process (Fry, 2000). This 
research attempted to perform similar studies of models with a much larger dataset 
that will include data that are not solely related to safety, but also maintenance, 
manning, and inspections results to provide a more comprehensive snapshot of 
the organization. 
The review of literature for this research included textbooks, previous NPS 
research, and case studies in the fields of regression analysis, time series analysis, 
trend estimation, descriptive statistics, and data optimization. The textbooks cited 
focus on the study of statistics, with a major emphasis on linear regression. The 
previously conducted research reviewed focus on mishaps in the Navy and various 
methods used to correlate mishaps to variables.  
A. PREVIOUS WORK 
Previously conducted research includes Le’s (2017) analysis of the 
correlation of U.S. Navy helicopter mishaps to flight hours and Lacy’s (1998) 
analysis of U.S. Navy afloat mishaps and the human factors involved. Although we 
were unable to find bodies of work with specific regard to the use of regression 
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and U.S. Navy afloat mishaps, there is a significant body of work regarding 
regression and Naval Aviation mishaps. The study conducted by Le that attempts 
to correlate number of flight hours to naval rotary wing mishaps provides a 
comparable methodology for the work performed in this study. Le developed 
models to explore the correlation between the Naval Aviation mishaps and the 
effects of DoD spending cuts, reduction of flight hours, pilot fatigue, and pilot 
proficiency. The scope of Le’s research was limited to the H-60 platform and 
parallels our research which is limited to the LHD Wasp class, LPD San Antonio 
class, and CG Ticonderoga class. Our use of simple linear regression to determine 
whether the variables we captured are correlated to the occurrence of a mishap 
aboard a surface ship is similar to that of Le’s use of logistic regression. Through 
the use of logistic regression, Le was able to find statistically significant effects 
between the established control and dependent variables used in the study. 
Lacy conducted research which focused on applying the Human Factors 
Accident Classification System (HFACS), traditionally used by the Navy and 
Marine Corps to investigate and attribute cause to aviation mishaps, to the afloat 
and subsurface platforms. This illustrates the potential to apply research in the 
aviation mishap field to afloat platform mishaps. 
B. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
Linear regression provided much of the foundation for the conclusions 
drawn by this research. Montgomery, Peck, Vining, and Vining (2012) define linear 
regression as the statistical method used for examining two or more variables the 
association between them. Montgomery et al. also note that regression models do 
not imply a cause-and-effect relationship between variables and that they may only 
be aids in confirming a cause-and-effect relationship, not the sole basis. Hocking 
(2013) explains that the squared correlation, denoted by R2, will be called the 
square multiple correlation or coefficient of determination. According to Weisberg 
(2013), R2 is a scale-free one-number summary of the strength of the association 
between the independent variable and the dependent variable in a given data set. 
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In our research and using to the tools available to us we calculated R2 in decimal 
notation and converted the number to a percentage for concision. Percentages for 
R2 values in linear regression will be between 0 and 100%. A 0% R2 value 
indicates no correlations between the variables used, whereas a 100% correlation 
indicates a direct and strong relationship between the variables used. In our case, 
the likelihood that we are attempting to predict is the occurrence of Class A or 
Class B mishap aboard specific U.S. Navy surface ship types. The regression 
analysis we attempted was between the occurrence of a mishap and each of the 
variables listed in the overview that we were able to obtain in our data collection 
phase. 
C. TIME SERIES ANALYSIS AND TREND ESTIMATION 
The ultimate goal of this research was to prevent mishaps before they occur 
and thus a focus on time and prediction was needed to identify when an 
intervention is needed. Time series analysis provides a very basic means of 
identifying trends. According to Kirchgässner (2013), the study of consistencies in 
collections of variables over time is time series analysis. Time series analysis can 
also makes use of observed regularities to predict future developments. The 
regularities that our research sought to identify were trends among our 
independent variables leading up to a mishap.  
Trend estimation is a form of statistical analysis that focuses on the 
identification of trends in time series data. This form of statistical analysis will be 
used in conjunction with time series analysis to visually identify trends as we plot 
our independent variables as a time series. 
D. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The goal of statistical analysis is to simplify a substantial amount of data by 
sorting, grouping, illustration and summary statistics. Our research sought to 
analyze shipboard data (specifically LPD San Antonio Class, LHD, and CG) in 
order to identify correlations that may be defined as statistically significant in 
predicting Class A and B mishaps. As the military seeks to understand why 
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mishaps occur, there have been a significant number of studies in many areas that 
attempt to find the underlying factors. Giese, Carr, and Chahal (2013), conducted 
a study examining mishap statistics for Unmanned Systems (UAV) and human 
factors that may have contributed to the mishaps. Giese et al. (p. 1191) stated, 
“The history of UAV mishaps in general are a good measure of the role of human 
factor failures, due to the severity of resulting failures and the expected rigor of 
processes associated with documenting and investigating aviation mishaps.” As 
with any research and statistical analysis, the quality and amount of data available 
are extremely important to the number of models that can be built to construct a 
detailed analysis of your collected data.  
Statistics is a technique whereby data are gathered, arranged, analyzed, 
and examined for simple visual representation and to aid in decision-making. In 
this study, descriptive statistics provides the basic features of our data by allowing 
us to simplify and generalize our data. Descriptive statistics are also used to 
legitimize inferences of statistical results taken from a group or large dataset 
(Peatman, 1947). The data obtained in this research range from 2009 to 2017 and 
the associated mishaps range from 2012 to 2017. The data were either collected 
only for, or narrowed down to, the ship classes identified above. This will be 
explained in detail in Chapter III (Methodology) Section A. The DoD has utilized 
statistics in numerous safety related research areas to identify causes of specific 
phenomenon, whether that phenomenon is a safety related mishap or other failure 
in equipment. A study conducted by the Naval Health and Research Center in 1984 
performed an analysis of the underlying variables in diving accidents and mishaps. 
The study’s objective was to determine the most commonly occurring underwater 
mishaps and to determine the underlying factors that contributed to these mishaps 
(Blood & Hoiberg, 1984).   
Our research relied heavily on the variables and data associated with 
studied surface ships to identify a correlation in our modelling. The descriptive 
analysis presents quantitative descriptions in a manageable way and provides 
summaries either in a quantitative form that are considered summary statistics or 
 13 
in a visual form to include graphical representation. Data must be condensed 
before being utilized as a foundation for extrapolation. When given a set of raw 
data one of the most useful ways of summarizing that information is to find an 
average of that set of data. Finding a simple average when looking at a specific 
set of data might seem elementary but depending on the research being 
conducted, this can be very helpful in identifying outliers.  
Visual representation of data is an essential part of descriptive statistics; the 
most commonly used method of sorting large data sets is a graphical 
representation. Other visual methods include pie charts, bar charts, histograms, 
and data plots. Having the capability to present research in one of these forms 
provides a clear representation of the data gathered and the significance of the 
outcome. The primary goal of a chart diagram is to provide a quick display that is 
easy to read and interpret. The importance of descriptive statistics to this study, in 
tandem with time series analysis, is to allow for the presentation of raw data in a 
manner which can comprehend and interpreted quickly.  
E. DATA OPTIMIZATION 
Data Optimization aims at the preparation and sound representation of the 
statistical outcome. It is also used on raw data from the sources to produce a viable 
report. Optimization provides a powerful toolbox to solve data analysis and 
learning problems (Wright, 2013) and aids in maximizing the speed and efficiency 
with which data are retrieved. Optimization tools are mixed and matched to 
address data analysis tasks and goals of the project. Data mapping is a process 
that entails conversion or reconciliation of data from its source in order to utilize 
the data in a model.  
Data optimization includes the use of software equipped with specific 
features for the execution purposes. A basic optimization has objective functions 
that one seeks to maximize on, while the variables place limits on the boundaries 
of the domain of the variables. Optimization is thus important to this research as it 
allows us to more efficiently present the data and subsequent finding of the study. 
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In Regression Modeling Strategies, Nuñez et al state the value of data optimization 
as it relates to regression analysis. 
When building a model, one should use a statistical method that 
matches the structure of the data being modeled and is suited to the 
sample size by limiting the number of variables according to the 
number of events. (Nuñez, Steyerberg, & Nuñez, 2011, pp. 502–503) 
This is aided by optimization in conjunction with descriptive statistics. As 
stated by Nuñez et al, Optimization supports regression modelling by measuring 
the practicality of the final model with respects to normalization measures. If 
resources allow, test the prediction model on other data. Optimization has several 
benefits as it can clearly indicate a significant relationship between dependent 
variables and an independent variable. Also, optimization can be used to illustrate 
the impact of multiple independent variables on a dependent variable. Safety and 
mishaps can be examined using many optimization techniques. Research 
conducted by Longborough University utilized optimization safety analysis of 
obstacle evasion for UAVs. Srikanthakumar, Liu, and Chen (2012, p. 12) stated, 
“Local and Global optimization methods are applied to the problem of evaluating a 
worse-case condition and parameters for the UAV collision avoidance systems.”  
This starts with evaluating criteria and utilizing optimization methods to identify 
worse case scenarios in UAV flight patterns. Previous studies and this current 
research optimize data in order to represent trends and clearly display outcomes 
to the audience. 
F. SUMMARY 
Our research is comprised of different statistical methods in order to reach 
a conclusion from the data sample. Regression, descriptive statistics, modeling, 
and analysis are forms of predictive modeling that allow us to investigate the 
relationship between dependent and independent variables; in addition to 
exploring the causal effect relationship between variables (Menard, 2002). The 
sources and information reviewed that were similar to our research all have 
different approach methods for analyzing their data. A broad range of safety 
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related studies have shown the relevance and significance of statistical methods 
in data collection. The related previous works and research along with the use of 
regression analysis, time series analysis, trend estimation, descriptive statistics, 
and data optimization have been reviewed for use in this study.  
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III. METHODOLOGY 
A. RESEARCH APPROACH 
The research approaches taken in this study center on correlating 
independent variables to dependent variables. The dependent variable is the 
occurrence of a Class A and B mishap aboard the LHD Wasp class, LPD San 
Antonio class, and CG Ticonderoga class ships from May 2012 to January 2017. 
The independent variables used include Commanding Officer turnover dates in 
relation to mishaps dates, CASREP counts, CASREP duration, number of DFSs, 
INSURV inspection scores, Safety Assessment scores, and Operating Tempo 
(OPTEMPO) as extrapolated from shipyard availability periods. Linear regression 
was used as the main method for finding correlation. Where linear regression was 
not feasible, an analysis of the trends in relation to the mishap dates was 
performed. The attempt to correlate the independent and dependent variables was 
in hope of building a predictive model which could identify ships at risk for Class A 
and B mishaps. However, no consistently significant correlation was discovered 
with the variables used in our analysis.  
B. DATA COLLECTION 
When beginning to collect data for this research, we narrowed down the 
ship classes to be studied based on the mishap reports provided by the 
COMNAVSURFPAC Force Safety Team (N-05). The majority of mishaps were 
found in the LHD Wasp class, LPD San Antonio class, and CG Ticonderoga class 
ships. Our data collection was narrowed to only these three classes for the 
remainder of this research. N-05 is involved in the Pacific Fleet to gain knowledge 
and report on operational safety, occupational safety, and recreational / off-duty 
safety for all units within their chain of command. Overall, data kept in the surface 
warfare community were found to be decentralized and difficult to gain. Access to 
numerous website portals, some requiring Common Access Card (CAC) login, was 
needed. In addition, the support from many Department of Defense (DoD) affiliated 
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research commands was vital to obtain the data in the areas identified as 
significant for possible mishap identifiers. 
Casualty reports were identified as an important piece of data for this 
research, as they can aid in understanding a ship’s readiness and materiel issues. 
Gaining access to Maintenance Figure of Merit (MFOM) data was the first objective 
in pulling various CASREP data. The MFOM system is the formatting and 
maintenance website where all naval units can create, update, monitor, and cancel 
CASREPs. Upon gaining access to MFOM, it was found that all data are current 
and do not reflect historical reports that would be needed to perform this section 
of the research. 
Having to look for a different course of action, we found that the Corona, CA 
Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC), comprised of active duty, retired, and 
civilian engineers who perform data analysis in a variety of areas for Naval ships 
was able to assist in extracting numerous historical CASREP data for our 
researched ship classes. NSWCs are a subcomponent of 
COMNAVSEASYSCOM. NSWC Corona’s website provides us with the official 
mission statement of the command. 
NSWC Corona’s mission statement is to serve warfighters and 
program managers as the Navy's independent assessment agent 
throughout systems’ lifecycles by gauging the Navy's warfighting 
capability of weapons and integrated combat systems, from unit to 
force level, through assessment of those systems' performance, 
readiness, quality, supportability, and the adequacy of training. 
(Naval Surface Warfare Center, n.d.)  
The CASREP data received included the ship classes pertaining to this 
research with the number of CASREPs each unit had in numerical count, broken 
down according to the severity (Category 2–4) for each month within the date 
range 2009–2017. We obtained data as far back as 2009 in order to ensure 
sufficient predictive data would be available for all our mishaps. Our earliest 
mishap occurred in 2012 and it was our goal to obtain data at least five years prior 
to the earliest mishap for each of our variables. In addition to the count and 
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severity, the CASREPs duration in hours were used in this research. For each 
month, the duration of how many CASREPs were open in that particular month for 
any given ship was another portion of the data derived in the CASREP portion of 
the data analysis. 
DFS data were important for this research. DFS data were stored in the 
Electronic DFS CAC protected website. E-forms is a web-based workflow 
application that supports multiple electronic engineering forms. Not only does it 
provide a workflow process, but it also stores the data for historical analysis and 
review. There are options to perform a search by Submarines, Carriers, and 
Surface Navy assets. In addition, there is a capability to initialize a DFS or view 
active, pending, overdue, and archived departures. The archived DFS reports 
gathered in support of this research ranged from 2009–2017. As the reports were 
extracted, we were able to sort the data in a cleaner fashion by viewing how many 
DFSs any unit had in the years or months prior to a mishap. 
Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV) report data were identified as 
significant. These inspections are mandated by congress and performed every five 
years to examine the proficiency of underway demonstrations in addition to the 
materiel status of the ship. The INSURV command, based out of Norfolk, VA has 
numerous departments that collect and analyze the data from the numerous 
inspections conducted each year on all platforms. For the purpose of this research, 
we utilized the plans, analysis, and report departments within the command for 
providing the data on the platforms of interest. The data derived here were 
historical inspection results from 2009–2017 reported in decimal form (.00–.99). 
We were able to view the previous INSURV inspection results prior to a mishap 
and compare that with units that did not have a mishap.  
Additional data were collected to understand the Operational Tempo of that 
particular unit. We were able to obtain data for the amount of fuel consumed (in 
gallons) in any given month, and the number of hours a unit spent underway and 
not underway. No later than the 3rd day of every month NEURS data are gathered 
by every ship and submitted via Navy message and consolidated on the Type 
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Commanders readiness management system. The NEURS report has data 
consisting of days underway, hours underway, hours not underway, fuel consumed 
in gallons underway, and fuel consumed in gallons not underway, among other 
pieces of energy related reported data. Type commander’s energy data analysis 
departments use these reports and numbers from each ship to develop quarterly 
fuel reports and develop class baselines. For our research, 
COMFLTFORCOMINST 4790.8C Section 3, the Maintenance and Material 
Management (3-M) System database explains how NEURS fuel and underway 
data are obtained and loaded in the database (Department of the Navy, 2017). 
Upon gaining access to this database, we were able to filter and extract the 
NEURS data from 2009–2017 for our researched classes.  
Shipyard data are very relevant to our research. Knowing if a ship was 
previously in a maintenance availability can be used to determine the operational 
tempo of that unit. Maintenance availabilities vary in length and are extremely 
important for the upkeep of all ships. You can argue that ships lose proficiency 
when in a longer maintenance availability period than ships with short availabilities. 
The Type Commander (TYCOM) Fleet Maintenance schedulers track and plan all 
repair activities for the ships within their respective Fleet concentration area. The 
Fleet Maintenance schedulers provided historical data for all the ships we 
requested. The information provided consisted of past maintenance availabilities, 
location of repairs, and length of time a ship was in the availability. 
Commanding Officer (CO) information and the amount of time a given CO 
was in command is important to this study. For this research, PERS-41 was the 
source of data on the average amount of time a CO normally holds a position 
before a change of command is conducted. The Surface Warfare Community 
Career path is not strictly adhered to by every Surface Warfare Officer, but it does 
provide a general view on milestones and the average time spent in specific 
positions throughout a career. The average time for a CO to be in command is 18 
months as shown in Figure 1. During our data collection phase, we attempted to 
obtain historical CO turnover data from, type commands manning departments, 
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PERS-41, and Surface Warfare Officer School. However, none of those 
organizations claimed to maintain the historical data we requested for this 
research. We were able to obtain most of the information we needed from the 
ship’s public website. However, the public websites for the ships we researched 
did not all have an up-to-date Past Leadership section and we had to directly 
contact some of the ships to obtain the dates we needed. Each Executive Officer 
currently serving on that unit provided the historical data for previous Commanding 
Officers on that unit dating back to 2009.  
 
Figure 1.  Career Path Indicating 18 Month Command at Sea Tour. 
Source: Naval Personnel Command (2018). 
Every two or three years, at times that best fit within a ship’s schedule, a 
ship will undergo a safety inspection conducted by the Naval Safety Center 
Command. The Naval Safety Center provided the historical safety reports for our 
researched units. The data contained within these reports lists the discrepancies, 
the surveyor’s detailed notes and survey checklists that were used in the 
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descriptive statistics portion of the data examination. Discrepancies categorized 
as significant would include failure to comply with designated safety instruction, 
fire hazards, improper ventilation, improper maintenance of safety of life items, and 
improper storage of hazardous material. All other discrepancies would be included 
in total discrepancies.  
C. LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
Linear regression analysis was conducted to attempt to find correlation 
between mishaps and CASREP counts, CASREP duration, DFSs, steaming hours 
underway, and steaming hours not underway.  
The first data set used to conduct regression analysis contained all ships of 
the LHD Wasp class, LPD San Antonio class, and CG Ticonderoga class in 
addition to totals of each independent variable used for the 2009–2017 timeframe 
(see Table 1). For the dependent variable, mishaps, there was one column which 
contained the number of mishaps that each ship had during the 2009–2017 
timeframe. R-squared values were obtained for each variable across all three ship 
classes for the entire time frame. In addition to the R-squared values across all 
ship classes, R-squared values were also obtained using deviation from the class 
average for each independent variable. For example, the most statistically 
significant R-squared value we calculated for this model was based on the 
deviation from the class average number of CAT 2 CASREPs. The R-squared 
value was 8.59%, which in terms of linear regression means that only 8.6% of the 
total variation is explained by the relationship between the two variables. This 
would indicate very little correlation between the two variables. Every other R-
squared value calculated using this data set was less than 8.59%. 
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Table 1.   First Linear Regression Dataset 
 
 
The second data set used was similar to the first, but the time frame for the 
independent variables was shortened to 2011–2017 to include only data from one 
year prior to our earliest mishap. Tables 2, 3 and 4 collectively are the second 
dataset. In addition to CASREP counts, this model added CASREP durations. This 
model yielded more significant findings, but still nothing genuinely conclusive. For 
the second data set, linear regression analysis was also conducted within each 
class. The R-squared values calculated within class of ship were more significant 
than those calculated across all ships. The most statistically significant R-squared 
value from this model was the CAT 4 CASREP Duration variable for the LPD class 
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and the value was 43.99%. The second most significant R-squared value was the 
steaming hours underway variable for the LHD class and the value was 42.87%. 
Table 2.   Second Linear Regression Dataset (CG Only) 
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Table 3.   Second Linear Regression Dataset (LHD & LPD) 
 
Table 4.   Second Linear Regression Dataset (Across All Classes) 
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D. TIME SERIES ANALYSIS AND TREND ESTIMATION 
In addition to linear regression analysis, we also attempted to identify trends 
in various timeframes leading up to a mishap using time series analysis and trend 
estimation. For this portion of our research, we graphed each applicable variable 
on a time series graph for time periods of three, six, and twelve months. The data 
selected for each time series graph encompasses the values of a particular 
variable for a timeframe leading up to a recorded shipboard mishap. For example, 
we graphed the steaming hours underway variable data for the 12-month period 
leading up to each recorded mishap. Figure 2 depicts the graph. We then 
attempted to identify general trends such as increases, decreases, or spikes that 
were common to all or most ships on the graph. In addition to performing this type 
of analysis for each variable for all the recorded mishaps, we did a ship class 
analysis of the same type in order to attempt to identify trends within specific 
classes of ships. The objective was to identify increases or decreases leading up 
to a mishap, such as a steady increase in steaming hours underway prior to the 
occurrence of a mishap. If trends are identified with one or more variables, then 
some predictive value may be extrapolated from the trends.  
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Figure 2.  Steaming Hours Underway 12 Months Prior to All Mishaps 
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IV. RESULTS 
In this chapter we present the results of our attempts to find correlations 
between the data we were able to collect and the likelihood of a mishap occurring 
on the three classes of ships we studied. In addition, we’ll discuss some of the 
characteristics of the mishaps studied that may have impacted the results of our 
work.  
A. LINEAR REGRESSION 
The first attempt at linear regression yielded no statistically significant 
correlations to number of mishaps with any of the independent variables. The first 
dataset’s independent variables included the total number of DFSs, total number 
of CAT 2 CASREPs, total number of CAT 3 CASREPs, total number of CAT4 
CASREPs, total steaming hours while underway, total steaming hours while not 
underway, and total steaming hours. In addition to the independent variables listed 
above, a class average was calculated for each class and the deviation from the 
class average for each variable was also used as independent variables for the 
first model. The dependent variable was the number of Class A & B mishaps that 
each ship had within the time frame of the first data set. The first dataset covers 
the 2009–2017 timeframe. The reason we started with 2009 was that for all of our 
data sources used in linear regression, the common starting date for all 
independent variable data was 2009. The linear regression model provided an R2 
value for each of the 14 variables across all ships. None of the R2 values were of 
statistical significance and would not adequately infer any correlation. The highest 
R2 value provided an 8.59% correlation between mishaps and the deviation from 
the class average for total CAT 2 CASREP count. This value is potentially inflated 
because LHD-1 had three mishaps, the highest of any LHD in the dataset and 
coincidentally had the highest total CAT 2 CASREP count in its class and therefore 
the highest deviation from the class average. However, as LHD-1 is the first ship 
in its class and the oldest ship in its class; the high number of CAT 2 CASREPs is 
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potentially explained by its age and the trend of increasing CAT 2 CASREP with 
age is generally seen in all ships of the class. This could potentially indicate a 
higher correlation of mishaps with the ship’s age than with CAT 2 CASREP counts.  
Due to the very low significance of the R2 values provided by the first model, 
some changes were made to the linear regression methods used in the second 
dataset to obtain more significant values. The second attempt at linear regression 
was performed on a modified dataset similar to that of the first model. The changes 
included shortening the time frame from 2009–2017 to 2011–2017. This change 
was made to decrease the data in the dataset because the first mishap we studied 
occurred in 2012 and we theorized there may be a stronger correlation with the 
data only one year prior to the first mishap versus data including the five years 
prior to our first mishap. The earliest mishap in our dataset occurs in 2012 and 
independent variable data that included data from five years prior to the first 
mishap may have been contributing to the low correlation of the first model. In 
addition to the time frame change, linear regression analysis was also conducted 
within class as well as across all ships to attempt to see if correlations were more 
significant within ship classes. Also, since linear regression was being conducted 
within ship classes; the variable regarding deviations from class averages was 
removed in the second dataset.  
The results of the linear regression analysis performed on the second 
dataset did yield more statistically significant results. However, we do not believe 
the results were significant enough to yield potential predictive value. Four 
independent variables stood out as being the most statistically significant and 
those were, in order of significance CAT 4 Duration for LPDs, Steaming Hours 
Underway for LHDs, Total DFSs for LHDs, and CAT 3 Duration for LHDs. The 
strongest correlation in the second dataset was that between number of mishaps 
and the CAT 4 Duration variable for LPDs. This variable was calculated by 
cumulatively adding the number of hours a ship had a CAT 4 CASREP open during 
the 2011–2017 timeframe. The resultant R2 value for the correlation between LPD 
mishaps and CAT 4 Duration was .4399 or 44%. However, this figure is skewed 
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by USS New York (LPD-21), which has the most mishaps in the LPD class with 
three mishaps during the timeframe. USS New York has the highest CAT 4 
Duration with 1782 hours and coming in second is USS Mesa Verde (LPD-19) with 
less than half of that at 817 hours. The other three semi-significant variables, are 
all within the LHD class. Steaming Hours Underway, Total DFSs, and CAT 3 
Duration are skewed by USS Wasp (LHD-1), which also has the highest number 
of mishaps in the ship class. The degree to which the variables are skewed by 
USS Wasp is to a lesser degree than USS New York. However, the statistical 
significance of the correlations is fairly low to begin with. Steaming Hours 
Underway for LHDs is 42%, Total DFSs is 35%, and CAT 3 Duration is 30%. The 
next closest significant value was CAT 3 Count for LHDs at 21%. 
 We can say with a fair amount of certainty that the variables used in this 
linear regression analysis do not have potential to provide predictive value for the 
future of shipboard mishaps.  
B. TIME SERIES ANALYSIS AND TREND ESTIMATION 
The results of the time series analysis and trend estimation provided us with 
no clear trends for any of the variables which we plotted. All of the graphs show a 
fairly random distribution for each variable and for reach time frame. All of the time 
series graphs generated as part of this research are included the in Appendix for 
future reference and research.  
C. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND DATA OPTIMIZATION 
The CO turnover data, shipyard maintenance availabilities, safety 
inspection reports, and INSURV scores datasets were analyzed using descriptive 
statistics, data optimization, and trend analysis.  
For the CO turnover data, we only gathered data for the ships that 
experienced a mishap between 2012–2017, so our examination only included the 
mishap ships. The way in which attempted to identify a trend or pattern was to 
average the length of time a CO was in command prior the mishap date for all ship 
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classes combined. Based on the PERS-41 Surface Warfare Officer career path, 
the average length of time for a CO tour is 18 months. Including all researched 
ship classes together, the average amount of time a CO was in command prior to 
a mishap was 232 days, roughly 7.5 months. With this result, an argument could 
be made that ships are more likely to experience a mishap in the first half of the 
CO’s tour, as depicted in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3.  CO Days in Command Prior to Each Mishap 
Maintenance availability data prior to the mishap were important to this 
research; mainly, the most recent repair availability and the length of time spent in 
that specific availability. For all ships that experienced a mishap in all classes, the 
average number of days in the most recent availability prior to the mishap was 269 
days, roughly nine months. This is a significant amount of time dedicated to 
repairing a ship and minimizing underway experience. In addition, the projected 
amount of crew turnover that occurs in a lengthy availability increases, which can 
increase mishap probability. As indicated in Table 5, four ships were in the 
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availability when the mishap occurred and were not included in the average. The 
number of days between the end of the most recent availability period and the 
occurrence of a mishap was an average of 500 days. 





















LHD-1 WASP 11/12/2016 09/03/13 11/26/14 449.00 717 
LHD-1 WASP 10/22/2015 09/03/13 11/26/14 449.00 330 
LHD-1 WASP 9/7/2016 09/03/2013 11/26/2014 449.00 651 
LHD-2 ESSEX 5/15/2012 08/26/2009 11/04/2009 70.00 923 
LHD-3 KEARSARGE 6/30/2016 06/13/2016 02/24/2017 256.00 in avail  
LHD-5 BATAAN 8/29/2016 01/07/15 01/25/2016 383.00 217 
LHD-7 IWO JIMA 7/7/2015 01/23/13 12/11/2013 322.00 573 
LHD-7 IWO JIMA 3/9/2015 01/23/13 12/11/2013 322.00 453 
LHD-8 MAKIN ISLAND 10/27/2016 04/27/2015 12/11/2015 228.00 321 
LPD-20 GREEN BAY 2/13/2015 07/10/2013 06/13/2014 338.00 245 
LPD-21 NEW YORK 6/22/2014 01/14/13 08/16/2013 214.00 310 
LPD-21 NEW YORK 1/27/2015 01/14/2014 08/16/2014 214.00 164 
LPD-21 NEW YORK 12/31/2014 01/14/2015 08/16/2015 214.00 in avail  
LPD-23 ANCHORAGE 11/22/2015 08/06/2013 12/16/2013 132.00 706 
LPD-23 ANCHORAGE 5/21/2013 08/06/2014 12/16/2014 132.00 in avail  
CG-54 ANTIETAM 2/14/2013 02/14/2012 07/06/2012 143.00 223 
CG-54 ANTIETAM 1/31/2017 04/26/2016 11/22/2016 210.00 70 
CG-61 MONTEREY 3/7/2014 02/19/2014 08/14/2015 541.00 in avail  
CG-61 MONTEREY 1/22/2013 12/01/2011 05/03/2012 154.00 264 
CG-62 
CHANCELLORSVILLE 11/16/2013 04/17/2012 03/29/2013 346.00 232 
CG-66 HUE CITY 4/14/2014 09/29/2010 05/13/2011 226.00 1067 
CG-69 VICKSBURG 6/23/2015 06/16/2010 11/11/2010 148.00 1685 
CG-73 PORT ROYAL 6/10/2016 09/22/2014 06/12/2015 263.00 364 












The safety inspection data are grouped together for all ship classes in 
Table 6. The data are comprised of the number of discrepancies each particular 
unit had during the previous inspection prior to a mishap. The discrepancies are 
grouped by Total, Significant, and Repeat. The three ship classes researched are 
then broken up by the average number of discrepancies in that particular ship class 
and compared to the individual unit to see how they fared. We did not come to a 
conclusion based on the safety inspections that identified any particular trend in 
the number of discrepancies when compared to the average between each class. 
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Report Total Significant Repeat 
LHD-1 WASP 11/12/2016 11/4/2014 182 53 58 
LHD-1 WASP 10/22/2015 11/4/2014 182 53 58 
LHD-1 WASP 9/7/2016 11/4/2014 182 53 58 
LHD-2 ESSEX 5/15/2012 8/24/2012 154 19 43 
LHD-3 KEARSARGE 6/30/2016 10/31/2014 135 32 49 
LHD-5 BATAAN 8/29/2016 1/13/2015 141 67 49 
LHD-7 IWO JIMA 7/7/2015 3/7/2014 148 16 33 
LHD-7 IWO JIMA 3/9/2015 3/7/2014 148 16 33 
LHD-8 MAKIN ISLAND 10/27/2016 3/14/2014 118 11 40 
LPD-20 GREEN BAY 2/13/2015 10/22/2014 157 63 55 
LPD-21 NEW YORK 6/22/2014 10/22/2013 129 25 35 
LPD-21 NEW YORK 1/27/2015 10/23/2013 129 25 35 
LPD-21 NEW YORK 12/31/2014 10/24/2013 129 25 35 
LPD-23 ANCHORAGE 11/22/2015 10/27/2014 106 19 0 
LPD-23 ANCHORAGE 5/21/2013 10/27/2014 106 19 0 
CG-54 ANTIETAM 2/14/2013 12/10/2013 164 18 43 
CG-54 ANTIETAM 1/31/2017 12/11/2013 164 18 43 
CG-61 MONTEREY 3/7/2014 12/9/2013 175 20 50 
CG-61 MONTEREY 1/22/2013 12/10/2013 175 20 50 
CG-62 
CHANCELLORSVILLE 11/16/2013 10/1/2013 174 7 0 
CG-66 HUE CITY 4/14/2014 8/1/2011 122 27 7 
CG-69 VICKSBURG 6/23/2015 4/2/2014 113 9 18 
CG-73 PORT ROYAL 6/10/2016 2/5/2013 194 14 42 
  Class Averages (safety report years combined) 
   Total  Significant  Repeat  
  LHD Average 154 36 47 
  LPD Average 126 29 40 




INSURV inspection scores are depicted in Table 7. This tabular 
presentation did not show a strong correlation between mishap date and the 
previous INSURV score when compared to the class average of the year when 
that specific mishap occurred. Two instances within the class average column did 
not have data to compare the previous INSURV score with. Also, USS New York 
and USS Anchorage did not have INSURV data because they are new ships. 
There is not an evident correlation between the previous score being relatively 
lower than class average that would indicate a factor possibly contributing to a 
mishap. Also, with INSURV inspections occurring about every five years, the 
previous score could be at the extreme five years from the mishap occurring, 
making the timeframe too long and therefore the data become irrelevant to this 
research. It appears that ships score near the class average and in a few instances 




Table 7.   INSURV Inspection Score Prior to Each Mishap 
Ship Mishap Date 




LHD-1 WASP 11/12/2016 0.79 0.81 (2016) 
LHD-1 WASP 10/22/2015 0.79 0.74 (2015) 
LHD-1 WASP 9/7/2016 0.79 0.81 (2016) 
LHD-2 ESSEX 5/15/2012 0.77 no data 
LHD-3 KEARSARGE 6/30/2016 0.74 0.81 (2016) 
LHD-5 BATAAN 8/29/2016 0.67 0.81 (2016) 
LHD-7 IWO JIMA 7/7/2015 0.82 0.74 (2015) 
LHD-7 IWO JIMA 3/9/2015 0.82 0.74 (2015) 
LHD-8 MAKIN ISLAND 10/27/2016 0.79 0.81 (2016) 
LPD-20 GREEN BAY 2/13/2015 0.7 0.72 (2015) 
LPD-21 NEW YORK 6/22/2014 no data 0.73 (2014) 
LPD-21 NEW YORK 1/27/2015 no data 0.72 (2015)  
LPD-21 NEW YORK 12/31/2014 no data 0.73 (2014) 
LPD-23 ANCHORAGE 11/22/2015 no data 0.72 (2015) 
LPD-23 ANCHORAGE 5/21/2013 no data no data 
CG-54 ANTIETAM 2/14/2013 0.89 0.8 (2013) 
CG-54 ANTIETAM 1/31/2017 0.87 0.82 (2017) 
CG-61 MONTEREY 3/7/2014 0.85 0.83 (2014) 
CG-61 MONTEREY 1/22/2013 0.85 0.8 (2013) 
CG-62 
CHANCELLORSVILLE 11/16/2013 0.82 0.8 (2013) 
CG-66 HUE CITY 4/14/2014 0.89 0.83 (2013) 
CG-69 VICKSBURG 6/23/2015 0.84 0.83 (2015) 
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, FUTURE RESEARCH, AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
The ultimate goal of our research was to provide a predictive tool to identify 
ships at risk of Class A and B mishaps, but we were unable to provide that tool 
using the data we were able to collect and analyze. Although we did find some 
correlations in the data we analyzed, none of the correlations we discovered were 
statistically significant enough to create the foundation for a tool with predictive 
capacity. We believe most of the value of this research will be in identifying which 
variables can be safely disregarded in further research to provide a predictive 
capability of mishaps. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The linear regression analysis portion of our research yielded no statistically 
significant correlations between the dependent variable of the occurrence of a 
shipboard mishap and the independent variables listed here: 
• Number of DFSs 
• CAT 2 CASREP Count 
• CAT 2 CASREP Duration 
• CAT 3 CASREP Count 
• CAT 3 CASREP Duration 
• CAT 4 CASREP Count 
• CAT 4 CASREP Duration 
• Steaming Hours Underway 
• Steaming Hours Not Underway 
• Total Steaming Hours 
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This conclusion is based on the results of the linear regression technique 
used, which did not yield a coefficient of determination higher than 44% for any 
one variable. The coefficient of determination is a mathematical value which 
measures the correlation between the dependent and independent variables. Most 
of the coefficients of determination for the independent variables were significantly 
lower than 44%, but the ones of note were discussed in Chapter IV. 
For the time series analysis portion of our research, we attempted to 
represent a significant finding by graphing prior to each mishap, each independent 
variable for a three, six, and twelve-month time frame prior to each individual 
mishap. This time series and trend analysis did not yield any obvious trends with 
all of the variables showing a random distribution for each of the time frames we 
graphed. Without any clear trend, we were unable to build a foundation for a 
predictive tool using this methodology.  
Our research used other methods besides linear regression and time series 
analysis. Using the mean in data analysis was another approach for facets of our 
data. From the mean analysis comparing CO length of time in command 
individually and with all units that experienced mishap, it was evident that most 
COs were in the first half of their command tour when a mishap occurred. The 
other pieces of data that used mean analysis such as the safety inspection reports 
and INSURV reports did not show areas that were evidently above or below the 
mean leading us to a conclusion that the data was non-causative.   
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research was to identify factors that could assist in predicting Class A 
or B mishaps on Navy ships, and then build a model to be used in mishap 
prediction. As we progressed and gathered our data, many pieces of shipboard 
data and inspection results were identified as elements that could be used in our 
models and mishap prediction analysis. Future research with the goal of 
developing a predictive model to draw a conclusion on specific events can be 
conducted many different ways. People have opinions about what types of data 
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will help in drawing a conclusion as a predictive tool is developed. As researchers 
continue to analyze future mishaps, their work can be utilized to further guide in 
the selection of variables that may provide predictive value. If mishaps occur in a 
specific department, we recommend conducting an internal analysis first prior to 
attempting to extrapolate meaning from data external to that department.  
Each mishap from 2012–2017 that was reviewed for this study was very 
different, and arguments can be made that these need to be analyzed differently 
and separately, but this research grouped them all together to obtain a conclusion. 
Mishap types range from service member Injury to equipment damages, amongst 
others. Trying to predict mishaps is a challenging task. All events need to be looked 
at separately before pulling various pieces of historical data to look for possible 
contributing factors. 
For instance, if a ship were to have a mishap as a result of or in relation to 
an engineering equipment casualty, we recommend investigating that mishap in 
isolation of other mishaps. Some elements of our data collection and research may 
be relevant to future mishaps that are related to engineering equipment casualty. 
For example, since this is a projected engineering mishap, we recommend using 
engineering logs, training program assessments, and personnel manning numbers 
to look for potential causes for that mishap. This approach can be taken for a 
mishap experienced in any department, where you can gather data specific to that 
mishap. Also, behavior analysis and assessing the culture or climate of a 
command may assist investigators in drawing different conclusions from a typical 
mishap investigation.  
The gathering of such large amounts of historical data posed a significant 
challenge due to the numerous organizations that we had to contact to obtain it. 
Determining which organizations would have the data necessary was another 
challenge. There were data recommended for this study that might have an impact 
on our models and the conclusions drawn. As we contacted Afloat Training Group 
(ATG) in the data collection phase, it was found that data kept in these commands 
didn’t go back far enough to support this research. We learned previous training 
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cycle inspection reports were not kept in a database or hard copy for numerous 
commands. As future research is conducted, we recommend ATG keep an up to 
date database for ship training cycle reports and individual warfare certifications 
and inspection results. Early on in this research, we identified ATG data as a top 
factor in ship readiness evaluations, but were unable to utilize this area of focus in 
our data collection and analysis, as the data were unavailable to review. 
Other areas were identified as potential data collection items for this 
research, but mainly due to poor data records kept at numerous individual 
commands, we were unable to attain records for crew certification, 3-M, ship 
manning fit and fill data, Navy Enlisted Classification (NEC) shortfalls, navigation 
check ride reports, and additional crew intangibles such as a crew swap or 
homeport shift. As other research is conducted, from our experience, these records 
would aid in an analysis but historical data are not kept for these areas of focus. 
Future research would greatly benefit if shipboard data are consolidated to 
a small number of data archives, aiding in the data collection and filtering to specific 
events. As previously discussed, mishap events differ drastically, and building a 
model tailored to identify factors when combining all the mishaps together is a huge 
challenge. Future models and research would benefit from our research data but 
with other internal behavior analyses of individual ships, factors leading or 
contributing to mishaps might be discovered. 
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APPENDIX.  TIME SERIES AND TREND ANALYSIS CHARTS 
Included for future research are graphs for each variable that was applicable. The graphs range in time frames from 
three to twelve months prior to each mishap. Each variable was graphed for each ship that had a mishap between 2012 

























Number of Months Prior to MIshap
CAT 2 CASREP Count - 12 Months - All Mishaps
CG-54 2/14/2013 CG-54 1/31/2017 CG-61 1/22/2013 CG-61 3/7/2014 CG-62 11/16/2013
CG-66 4/14/2014 CG-69 6/23/2015 CG-73 6/10/2016 LHD-1 10/22/2015 LHD-1 9/7/2016
LHD-1 11/12/2016 LHD-2 5/15/2012 LHD-3 6/30/2016 LHD-5 8/29/2016 LHD-7 3/9/2015
LHD-7 7/7/2015 LHD-8 10/27/2016 LPD-20 2/13/2015 LPD-21 6/22/2014 LPD-21 12/31/2014























1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
CAT 2 CASREP Duration - 12 Months - All Mishaps
CG-54 2/14/2013 CG-54 1/31/2017 CG-61 1/22/2013 CG-61 3/7/2014 CG-62 11/16/2013
CG-66 4/14/2014 CG-69 6/23/2015 CG-73 6/10/2016 LHD-1 10/22/2015 LHD-1 9/7/2016
LHD-1 11/12/2016 LHD-2 5/15/2012 LHD-3 6/30/2016 LHD-5 8/29/2016 LHD-7 3/9/2015
LHD-7 7/7/2015 LHD-8 10/27/2016 LPD-20 2/13/2015 LPD-21 6/22/2014 LPD-21 12/31/2014












7 8 9 10 11 12
CAT 2 CASREP Duration - 6 Months - All Mishaps
CG-54 2/14/2013 CG-54 1/31/2017 CG-61 1/22/2013 CG-61 3/7/2014 CG-62 11/16/2013
CG-66 4/14/2014 CG-69 6/23/2015 CG-73 6/10/2016 LHD-1 10/22/2015 LHD-1 9/7/2016
LHD-1 11/12/2016 LHD-2 5/15/2012 LHD-3 6/30/2016 LHD-5 8/29/2016 LHD-7 3/9/2015
LHD-7 7/7/2015 LHD-8 10/27/2016 LPD-20 2/13/2015 LPD-21 6/22/2014 LPD-21 12/31/2014













CAT 2 CASREP Duration - 3 Months - All Mishaps
CG-54 2/14/2013 CG-54 1/31/2017 CG-61 1/22/2013 CG-61 3/7/2014 CG-62 11/16/2013
CG-66 4/14/2014 CG-69 6/23/2015 CG-73 6/10/2016 LHD-1 10/22/2015 LHD-1 9/7/2016
LHD-1 11/12/2016 LHD-2 5/15/2012 LHD-3 6/30/2016 LHD-5 8/29/2016 LHD-7 3/9/2015
LHD-7 7/7/2015 LHD-8 10/27/2016 LPD-20 2/13/2015 LPD-21 6/22/2014 LPD-21 12/31/2014
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CAT 2 CASREP Duration - 6 Months - CG Class
CG-54 2/14/2013 CG-54 1/31/2017 CG-61 1/22/2013 CG-61 3/7/2014













CAT 2 CASREP Duration - 3 Months - CG Class
CG-54 2/14/2013 CG-54 1/31/2017 CG-61 1/22/2013 CG-61 3/7/2014












7 8 9 10 11 12
CAT 2 CASREP Duration - 6 Months - LHD Mishaps
LHD-1 10/22/2015 LHD-1 9/7/2016 LHD-1 11/12/2016 LHD-2 5/15/2012 LHD-3 6/30/2016













CAT 2 CASREP Duration - 3 Months - LHD Mishaps
LHD-1 10/22/2015 LHD-1 9/7/2016 LHD-1 11/12/2016 LHD-2 5/15/2012 LHD-3 6/30/2016
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CAT 2 CASREP Duration - 6 Months - LPD Mishaps










CAT 2 CASREP Duration - 3 Months - LPD Mishaps












1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
CAT 3 CASREP Count - 12 Months - All Mishaps
CG-54 2/14/2013 CG-54 1/31/2017 CG-61 1/22/2013 CG-61 3/7/2014 CG-62 11/16/2013
CG-66 4/14/2014 CG-69 6/23/2015 CG-73 6/10/2016 LHD-1 10/22/2015 LHD-1 9/7/2016
LHD-1 11/12/2016 LHD-2 5/15/2012 LHD-3 6/30/2016 LHD-5 8/29/2016 LHD-7 3/9/2015
LHD-7 7/7/2015 LHD-8 10/27/2016 LPD-20 2/13/2015 LPD-21 6/22/2014 LPD-21 12/31/2014
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CAT 3 CASREP Count - 6 Months - All Mishaps
CG-54 2/14/2013 CG-54 1/31/2017 CG-61 1/22/2013 CG-61 3/7/2014 CG-62 11/16/2013
CG-66 4/14/2014 CG-69 6/23/2015 CG-73 6/10/2016 LHD-1 10/22/2015 LHD-1 9/7/2016
LHD-1 11/12/2016 LHD-2 5/15/2012 LHD-3 6/30/2016 LHD-5 8/29/2016 LHD-7 3/9/2015
LHD-7 7/7/2015 LHD-8 10/27/2016 LPD-20 2/13/2015 LPD-21 6/22/2014 LPD-21 12/31/2014













CAT 3 CASREP Count - 3 Months - All Mishaps
CG-54 2/14/2013 CG-54 1/31/2017 CG-61 1/22/2013 CG-61 3/7/2014 CG-62 11/16/2013
CG-66 4/14/2014 CG-69 6/23/2015 CG-73 6/10/2016 LHD-1 10/22/2015 LHD-1 9/7/2016
LHD-1 11/12/2016 LHD-2 5/15/2012 LHD-3 6/30/2016 LHD-5 8/29/2016 LHD-7 3/9/2015
LHD-7 7/7/2015 LHD-8 10/27/2016 LPD-20 2/13/2015 LPD-21 6/22/2014 LPD-21 12/31/2014












7 8 9 10 11 12
CAT 3 CASREP Count - 6 Months - CG Mishaps
CG-54 2/14/2013 CG-54 1/31/2017 CG-61 1/22/2013 CG-61 3/7/2014













CAT 3 CASREP Count - 3 Months - CG Mishaps
CG-54 2/14/2013 CG-54 1/31/2017 CG-61 1/22/2013 CG-61 3/7/2014












7 8 9 10 11 12
CAT 3 CASREP Count - 6 Months - LHD Mishaps
LHD-1 10/22/2015 LHD-1 9/7/2016 LHD-1 11/12/2016 LHD-2 5/15/2012 LHD-3 6/30/2016













CAT 3 CASREP Count - 3 Months - LHD Mishaps
LHD-1 10/22/2015 LHD-1 9/7/2016 LHD-1 11/12/2016 LHD-2 5/15/2012 LHD-3 6/30/2016
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CAT 3 CASREP Count - 6 Months - LPD Mishaps














CAT 3 CASREP Count - 3 Months - LPD Mishaps












1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
CAT 3 CASREP Duration - 12 Months - All Mishaps
CG-54 2/14/2013 CG-54 1/31/2017 CG-61 1/22/2013 CG-61 3/7/2014 CG-62 11/16/2013
CG-66 4/14/2014 CG-69 6/23/2015 CG-73 6/10/2016 LHD-1 10/22/2015 LHD-1 9/7/2016
LHD-1 11/12/2016 LHD-2 5/15/2012 LHD-3 6/30/2016 LHD-5 8/29/2016 LHD-7 3/9/2015
LHD-7 7/7/2015 LHD-8 10/27/2016 LPD-20 2/13/2015 LPD-21 6/22/2014 LPD-21 12/31/2014










7 8 9 10 11 12
CAT 3 CASREP Duration - 6 Months - All Mishaps
CG-54 2/14/2013 CG-54 1/31/2017 CG-61 1/22/2013 CG-61 3/7/2014 CG-62 11/16/2013
CG-66 4/14/2014 CG-69 6/23/2015 CG-73 6/10/2016 LHD-1 10/22/2015 LHD-1 9/7/2016
LHD-1 11/12/2016 LHD-2 5/15/2012 LHD-3 6/30/2016 LHD-5 8/29/2016 LHD-7 3/9/2015
LHD-7 7/7/2015 LHD-8 10/27/2016 LPD-20 2/13/2015 LPD-21 6/22/2014 LPD-21 12/31/2014














CAT 3 CASREP Duration - 3 Months - All Mishaps
CG-54 2/14/2013 CG-54 1/31/2017 CG-61 1/22/2013 CG-61 3/7/2014 CG-62 11/16/2013
CG-66 4/14/2014 CG-69 6/23/2015 CG-73 6/10/2016 LHD-1 10/22/2015 LHD-1 9/7/2016
LHD-1 11/12/2016 LHD-2 5/15/2012 LHD-3 6/30/2016 LHD-5 8/29/2016 LHD-7 3/9/2015
LHD-7 7/7/2015 LHD-8 10/27/2016 LPD-20 2/13/2015 LPD-21 6/22/2014 LPD-21 12/31/2014
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CAT 3 CASREP Duration - 6 Months - CG Mishaps
CG-54 2/14/2013 CG-54 1/31/2017 CG-61 1/22/2013 CG-61 3/7/2014











CAT 3 CASREP Duration - 3 Months - CG Mishaps
CG-54 2/14/2013 CG-54 1/31/2017 CG-61 1/22/2013 CG-61 3/7/2014










7 8 9 10 11 12
CAT 3 CASREP Duration - 6 Months - LHD Mishaps
LHD-1 10/22/2015 LHD-1 9/7/2016 LHD-1 11/12/2016 LHD-2 5/15/2012 LHD-3 6/30/2016











CAT 3 CASREP Duration - 3 Months - LHD Mishaps
LHD-1 10/22/2015 LHD-1 9/7/2016 LHD-1 11/12/2016 LHD-2 5/15/2012 LHD-3 6/30/2016
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CAT 3 CASREP Duration - 6 Months - LPD Mishaps














CAT 3 CASREP Duration - 3 Months - LPD Mishaps












1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Steaming Hours Underway - 12 Months - All Mishaps
CG-54 2/14/2013 CG-54 1/31/2017 CG-61 1/22/2013 CG-61 3/7/2014 CG-62 11/16/2013
CG-66 4/14/2014 CG-69 6/23/2015 CG-73 6/10/2016 LHD-1 10/22/2015 LHD-1 9/7/2016
LHD-1 11/12/2016 LHD-2 5/15/2012 LHD-3 6/30/2016 LHD-5 8/29/2016 LHD-7 3/9/2015
LHD-7 7/7/2015 LHD-8 10/27/2016 LPD-20 2/13/2015 LPD-21 6/22/2014 LPD-21 12/31/2014
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Steaming Hours Underway - 6 Months - All Mishaps
CG-54 2/14/2013 CG-54 1/31/2017 CG-61 1/22/2013 CG-61 3/7/2014 CG-62 11/16/2013
CG-66 4/14/2014 CG-69 6/23/2015 CG-73 6/10/2016 LHD-1 10/22/2015 LHD-1 9/7/2016
LHD-1 11/12/2016 LHD-2 5/15/2012 LHD-3 6/30/2016 LHD-5 8/29/2016 LHD-7 3/9/2015
LHD-7 7/7/2015 LHD-8 10/27/2016 LPD-20 2/13/2015 LPD-21 6/22/2014 LPD-21 12/31/2014













Steaming Hours Underway - 3 Months - All Mishaps
CG-54 2/14/2013 CG-54 1/31/2017 CG-61 1/22/2013 CG-61 3/7/2014 CG-62 11/16/2013
CG-66 4/14/2014 CG-69 6/23/2015 CG-73 6/10/2016 LHD-1 10/22/2015 LHD-1 9/7/2016
LHD-1 11/12/2016 LHD-2 5/15/2012 LHD-3 6/30/2016 LHD-5 8/29/2016 LHD-7 3/9/2015
LHD-7 7/7/2015 LHD-8 10/27/2016 LPD-20 2/13/2015 LPD-21 6/22/2014 LPD-21 12/31/2014
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Steaming Hours Underway - 6 Months - CG Mishaps
CG-54 2/14/2013 CG-54 1/31/2017 CG-61 1/22/2013 CG-61 3/7/2014












Steaming Hours Underway - 3 Months - CG Mishaps
CG-54 2/14/2013 CG-54 1/31/2017 CG-61 1/22/2013 CG-61 3/7/2014












7 8 9 10 11 12
Steaming Hour Underway - 6 Months - LHD Mishaps
LHD-1 10/22/2015 LHD-1 9/7/2016 LHD-1 11/12/2016 LHD-2 5/15/2012 LHD-3 6/30/2016













Steaming Hour Underway - 3 Months - LHD Mishaps
LHD-1 10/22/2015 LHD-1 9/7/2016 LHD-1 11/12/2016 LHD-2 5/15/2012 LHD-3 6/30/2016
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Steaming Hour Underway - 6 Months - LPD Mishaps













Steaming Hour Underway - 3 Months - LPD Mishaps












1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Steaming Hours Not Underway - 12 Motnths - All Mishaps
CG-54 2/14/2013 CG-54 1/31/2017 CG-61 1/22/2013 CG-61 3/7/2014 CG-62 11/16/2013
CG-66 4/14/2014 CG-69 6/23/2015 CG-73 6/10/2016 LHD-1 10/22/2015 LHD-1 9/7/2016
LHD-1 11/12/2016 LHD-2 5/15/2012 LHD-3 6/30/2016 LHD-5 8/29/2016 LHD-7 3/9/2015
LHD-7 7/7/2015 LHD-8 10/27/2016 LPD-20 2/13/2015 LPD-21 6/22/2014 LPD-21 12/31/2014
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Steaming Hours Not Underway - 6 Months - All Mishaps
CG-54 2/14/2013 CG-54 1/31/2017 CG-61 1/22/2013 CG-61 3/7/2014 CG-62 11/16/2013
CG-66 4/14/2014 CG-69 6/23/2015 CG-73 6/10/2016 LHD-1 10/22/2015 LHD-1 9/7/2016
LHD-1 11/12/2016 LHD-2 5/15/2012 LHD-3 6/30/2016 LHD-5 8/29/2016 LHD-7 3/9/2015
LHD-7 7/7/2015 LHD-8 10/27/2016 LPD-20 2/13/2015 LPD-21 6/22/2014 LPD-21 12/31/2014












Steaming Hours Not Underway - 3 Months - All Mishaps
CG-54 2/14/2013 CG-54 1/31/2017 CG-61 1/22/2013 CG-61 3/7/2014 CG-62 11/16/2013
CG-66 4/14/2014 CG-69 6/23/2015 CG-73 6/10/2016 LHD-1 10/22/2015 LHD-1 9/7/2016
LHD-1 11/12/2016 LHD-2 5/15/2012 LHD-3 6/30/2016 LHD-5 8/29/2016 LHD-7 3/9/2015
LHD-7 7/7/2015 LHD-8 10/27/2016 LPD-20 2/13/2015 LPD-21 6/22/2014 LPD-21 12/31/2014
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Steaming Hours Not Underway - 6 Months - CG Mishaps
CG-54 2/14/2013 CG-54 1/31/2017 CG-61 1/22/2013 CG-61 3/7/2014












Steaming Hours Not Underway - 3 Months - CG Mishaps
CG-54 2/14/2013 CG-54 1/31/2017 CG-61 1/22/2013 CG-61 3/7/2014













7 8 9 10 11 12
Steaming Hours Not Underway - 6 Months - LHD Mishaps
LHD-1 10/22/2015 LHD-1 9/7/2016 LHD-1 11/12/2016 LHD-2 5/15/2012 LHD-3 6/30/2016












Steaming Hours Not Underway - 3 Months - LHD Mishaps
LHD-1 10/22/2015 LHD-1 9/7/2016 LHD-1 11/12/2016 LHD-2 5/15/2012 LHD-3 6/30/2016
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Steaming Hours Not Underway - 6 Months - LPD Mishaps











Steaming Hours Not Underway - 3 Months - LPD Mishaps












1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Hours Not Steaming - 12 Months - All Mishaps
CG-54 2/14/2013 CG-54 1/31/2017 CG-61 1/22/2013 CG-61 3/7/2014 CG-62 11/16/2013
CG-66 4/14/2014 CG-69 6/23/2015 CG-73 6/10/2016 LHD-1 10/22/2015 LHD-1 9/7/2016
LHD-1 11/12/2016 LHD-2 5/15/2012 LHD-3 6/30/2016 LHD-5 8/29/2016 LHD-7 3/9/2015
LHD-7 7/7/2015 LHD-8 10/27/2016 LPD-20 2/13/2015 LPD-21 6/22/2014 LPD-21 12/31/2014
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Hours Not Steaming - 6 Months - All Mishaps
CG-54 2/14/2013 CG-54 1/31/2017 CG-61 1/22/2013 CG-61 3/7/2014 CG-62 11/16/2013
CG-66 4/14/2014 CG-69 6/23/2015 CG-73 6/10/2016 LHD-1 10/22/2015 LHD-1 9/7/2016
LHD-1 11/12/2016 LHD-2 5/15/2012 LHD-3 6/30/2016 LHD-5 8/29/2016 LHD-7 3/9/2015
LHD-7 7/7/2015 LHD-8 10/27/2016 LPD-20 2/13/2015 LPD-21 6/22/2014 LPD-21 12/31/2014















Hours Not Steaming - 3 Months - All Mishaps
CG-54 2/14/2013 CG-54 1/31/2017 CG-61 1/22/2013 CG-61 3/7/2014 CG-62 11/16/2013
CG-66 4/14/2014 CG-69 6/23/2015 CG-73 6/10/2016 LHD-1 10/22/2015 LHD-1 9/7/2016
LHD-1 11/12/2016 LHD-2 5/15/2012 LHD-3 6/30/2016 LHD-5 8/29/2016 LHD-7 3/9/2015
LHD-7 7/7/2015 LHD-8 10/27/2016 LPD-20 2/13/2015 LPD-21 6/22/2014 LPD-21 12/31/2014
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Hours Not Steaming - 6 Months - CG Mishaps
CG-54 2/14/2013 CG-54 1/31/2017 CG-61 1/22/2013 CG-61 3/7/2014













Hours Not Steaming - 3 Months - CG Mishaps
CG-54 2/14/2013 CG-54 1/31/2017 CG-61 1/22/2013 CG-61 3/7/2014
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Hours Not Steaming - 6 Months - LHD Mishaps
LHD-1 10/22/2015 LHD-1 9/7/2016 LHD-1 11/12/2016 LHD-2 5/15/2012 LHD-3 6/30/2016













Hours Not Steaming - 3 Months - LHD Mishaps
LHD-1 10/22/2015 LHD-1 9/7/2016 LHD-1 11/12/2016 LHD-2 5/15/2012 LHD-3 6/30/2016
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Hours Not Steaming - 6 Months - LPD Mishaps













Hours Not Steaming - 3 Months - LPD Mishaps
LPD-20 2/13/2015 LPD-21 6/22/2014 LPD-21 12/31/2014 LPD-21 1/27/2015 LPD-23 11/22/2015
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